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LAWYER 
JUSCELINO F. COLARES* 
 For over two decades, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”) and, more recently, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(“OECD Convention”) have delineated to U.S. lawyers and their 
clients which international transactions are proscribed and 
punished as corrupt. However, like any other statute, the FCPA and 
the OECD Convention are unable to cover all the permutations of 
activity that would seemingly constitute transnational corruption. 
This Article explores what is prohibited and permissible under the 
FCPA and the OECD Convention, highlighting the tension between 
operating outside the coverage of these legal precepts while still 
complying with the rules of professional conduct. It concludes by 
demonstrating, by means of various scenarios, that there is no 
substitute for a lawyer’s reliance on her professional and ethical 
judgment.  
 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; J.D. (2003), Cornell Law 
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INTRODUCTION† 
Lawyers are constantly aware of the ethical dilemmas that may arise 
during the representation of a client, particularly when the client’s 
activities cross national borders, where applicability of the norms 
governing routine domestic practice may be in doubt.1 These ethical issues 
are heightened by the dilemma an attorney faces when notified of a 
transaction that, though lucrative to the client, may expose the client to 
liability under the domestic laws that have extraterritorial reach.2 In these 
situations, U.S. lawyers are often put in the position of attempting to 
reconcile their responsibility to the client with their overarching duty to 
uphold the word and spirit of the law.3  
 † The author thanks Jennifer Schultz for reviewing several versions of this Article and for her 
thoughtful insights and suggestions. This Article would not have been ready for publication without 
Ms. Schultz's encouragement. The author would also like to thank Emily Westerberg Russell for her 
comments and suggestions with respect to earlier drafts. Any errors, however, are the author’s own. 
The views expressed herein are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of his prior clients or any 
prior or pending cases in which he participated.  
 1. In 2002, Transparency International reported that one in five respondents to a Gallup 
International poll across fifteen emerging market economies was aware of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention” or “Convention”), 
notably the same result to that obtained in the same survey conducted in 1999. Transparency 
International, Transparency International Releases New Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 2002, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/bpi2002 (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). Transparency 
International’s own Bribe Payers Index (“BPI”) survey revealed that forty-two percent of the 835 
respondents surveyed had not heard about the OECD Convention, with only seven percent being 
familiar with the Convention. Id. The survey also indicated that a very small portion of overseas 
business executives, including executives of western multinational corporations, were informed about 
or planned to enforce the OECD Convention. Id.  
 2. Though not reviewed here, there is an abundance of U.S. laws and regulations that discipline 
international business transactions, often reaching conduct taking place abroad. Among these are the 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (“Helms-Burton”) (22 U.S.C. 
§ 6001 et seq. (2000)), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. 
(2000)), the Trading with the Enemy Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 95a, 95b) (trade sanctions and embargoes 
against several countries), the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2000)), the State 
Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. §§ 121, 123 (2005)), U.S. export 
controls under the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a) lapsed but in force under 50 
U.S.C. § 1701) and Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) (15 C.F.R. §§ 730 et seq. (2005)), the 
Iran Sanctions Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701 note, renewed by Pub. L. No. 107-24 (Aug. 3, 2001)), the 
Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 et seq.), the Department of Commerce “Antiboycott 
Law” (15 C.F.R. § 760), and the Treasury Department “Antiboycott Law” (I.R.C. § 999 (1999)).  
 3. The obligation to heed to the spirit and letter of the law certainly extends well beyond 
international business practice and encompasses the entire legal profession. As a commentator has 
pointed out, the official commentary to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (1994) (“Model Rules”) is “replete with admonitions to obey the spirit of the law.” Rob 
Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 283 
n.104 (1995).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/2
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For over two decades, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)4 
has delineated to U.S. lawyers and their clients which international 
transactions are proscribed and punished as corrupt.5 While the FCPA 
specifically defines what constitutes corrupting a foreign official, it also 
raises difficult and complex legal, ethical, judgmental, and 
representational issues for lawyers and their clients.6 Like any other 
legislative enactment, the FCPA is unable to cover all the permutations of 
activity that would seemingly fall within the definition of transnational 
corruption.7 As such, the FCPA leaves counsel in the precarious position 
of attempting to preserve the client’s commercial interests and maneuver 
within the bounds of the law while struggling with the possibility that the 
client’s actions, although technically legal, may be contrary to the goals of 
the law.8  
 4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (issuers’ duty to report), 78dd-1(issuers), dd-2 (domestic concerns), dd-
3 (any person), 78ff (other penalties)); see also S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101.  
 5. See id. The statute: 
make[s] it a crime for a “domestic concern,” “issuer,” or “any person” not already covered as 
a domestic concern or issuer (and their officers, directors, employees, agents and shareholders 
acting on their behalf) to commit, with any required territorial nexus to the United States, an 
act [in the United States or abroad] in furtherance of a payment of an offer, promise, or 
authorization of a payment, of money or anything of value to a foreign official corruptly to 
secure that official’s action, inaction or influence, in a decision related to a business 
opportunity. 
Lucinda A. Low & William M. McGlone, Avoiding Problems Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, U.S. Antiboycott Laws, OFAC Sanctions, Export Controls, and the Economic Espionage Act, in 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE UPDATE 2004: TRENDS, TIPS AND PRACTICAL ADVICE, GEORGETOWN 
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, at 136 (Jan. 29–30, 2004) (on file with author). 
 6. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -1(g), -2(a), -3(a) (2000). Notably, lawyers and their clients have 
to be alert to the broad interpretation that federal law enforcement officials give to this statute. One 
example: the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) broadly defines FCPA prohibitions as “prohibit[ing] 
corrupt payments to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or keeping business.” DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/dojdocb.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). For an interesting 
and quick example of the complex world surrounding FCPA compliance, see also Northrop Grumman 
Electronic Systems, http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/Our_Values/new-employees/FCPA.htm 
(providing a “test yourself” FCPA-related set of questions) (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).  
 7. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 8. See id. Arguably, a lawyer’s concern with his client’s interests also extends to the protection 
of his client’s public image, which can be significantly damaged if the public perceives certain conduct 
as bribery. One commentator has described this situation:  
Bribery is a breach of people’s trust. People find corruption shameful and repugnant, and 
when confronted with corrupt public officials and their illicit gains, they invariably reject it. 
The difference today is that, in the modern electronic world, it is more obvious when it 
happens and more difficult to deny it.  
A. Timothy Martin, The Development of International Bribery Law, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 95, 
102 (1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Before developing some of the basic legal and ethical themes 
associated with “corruption” in international business transactions—
themes later analyzed in Part IV—this Article first summarizes the content 
of the FCPA in Part I. Because the FCPA is not the only law to prescribe 
criminal liability to U.S. companies who engage in corrupt practices, Part 
II will also briefly refer to other applicable statutes.  
Part III will then discuss the 1997 Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(“OECD Convention” or “Convention”), and show how it has given new 
impetus to the task of combating foreign corruption arising out of 
international business transactions.9 The Convention represents a sea of 
change in the international community’s attitude toward bribery and 
corruption, an area where the United States previously stood alone with 
legislation combating this form of corruption.10 Beyond leveling the 
playing field in the international business arena, the Convention greatly 
streamlines prosecutions under the FCPA because, among other things, it 
applies the nationality principle of jurisdiction.11 This principle 
significantly expands the jurisdictional basis for the prosecution of U.S. 
companies and U.S. nationals engaging in corruption practices that “take 
place wholly outside of the United States, regardless of whether ‘an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce’ is used in furtherance of the 
prohibited conduct.”12 In Part III, this Article also explores some 
 9. For about two decades since 1977, the United States was the only country that had anti-
foreign-corruption legislation like the FCPA. After the FCPA’s enactment, the most significant effort 
aiming to deter corrupt practices in the conduct of international business occurred under the auspices 
of the OECD, with the signing of a convention against bribery of foreign officials, the OECD 
Convention. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) (“OECD Convention”), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/21/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). Though 
less ambitious, the Organization of American States adopted the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption, OEA/Ser.K.XXXIV.1, CICOR/doc. 14/96 rev. 2 (Mar. 29, 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 
724 (1996), and the Council of Europe followed suit by promulgating the Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption on January 27, 1999. 38 I.L.M. 505 (1999), available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/173.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).  
 10. See John W. Brooks, Fighting International Corruption, 20 GPSolo 42 (LEXIS) (2003) 
(“The most significant development recently in international corruption law is the . . . OECD 
Convention . . . that entered into force in 1999.”).  
 11. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 4, para. 2.  
 12. See id. But see Stuart H. Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 33 INT’L LAW. 507, 514 (1999) 
(arguing that due to precedents of extraterritorial application of other federal statutes, the FCPA’s 
territorial nexus is minimal, and that, therefore, the OECD Convention’s reliance on nationality as a 
basis for jurisdiction does not represent a significant change).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/2
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distinctions between the approaches to foreign corruption contemplated in 
the FCPA and OECD Convention.  
Part IV will then develop three hypothetical examples that may (or may 
not) involve corruption under the present anti-bribery legal framework. 
The goal is to explore what is prohibited and permissible under the FCPA 
and the OECD Convention and to highlight the tension between operating 
outside the coverage of these legal precepts and complying with the rules 
of professional conduct. The legal analysis of these possible “corruption 
scenarios” will serve not only to draw attention to some complex legal and 
ethical problems that occur in foreign business transactions, but also to 
show how there are problems still not covered by the present anti-foreign-
bribery regime. The Article then concludes by revealing the need for 
lawyers to rely on the professional rules of conduct to guide their actions 
through the inherent legal gaps in this area.  
I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
A. Background of the FCPA 
In 1974, the United States was still reeling from the general loss of 
public trust resulting from the Watergate debacle when a new scandal 
emerged.13 Due to illegal payments some U.S. corporations had made to 
domestic political campaigns, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) created a voluntary disclosure program.14 In the resulting 
disclosures, over 300 companies admitted to making questionable 
payments, both domestically and abroad.15 The public responded 
overwhelming with disgust, with Congress sharing in the public’s 
sentiment.16 The scandal reached far beyond the borders of the United 
States17 and contributed to a legislative response that resulted in the 
passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.18  
 13. See Martin, supra note 8, at 97.  
 14. Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look 
at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1582 (1990); see also DOJ Website, supra note 6 
(“As a result of SEC investigations in the mid-1970’s, over 400 U.S. companies admitted making 
questionable or illegal payments in excess of $300 million to foreign government officials, politicians, 
and political parties.”).  
 15. Id.; S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101. But see 
Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economics in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 121, 123 (1996) (“[A]s many as 600 American firms made payments to foreign officials 
. . . .”).  
 16. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4099.  
 17. “Foreign governments friendly to the United States in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands have 
come under intense pressure from their own people.” S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3, reprinted in 1977 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As originally drafted, the FCPA proscribed the payment of bribes to 
foreign officials in exchange for foreign government contracts or other 
types of business.19 The FCPA was almost immediately met with criticism. 
The primary argument was that the FCPA prevents American companies 
from effectively competing in international settings where “gifts” and 
“tributes” are the norm.20 
One can respond to much of this criticism with two separate, though 
related, arguments: (a) corporate bribery of foreign officials, if left 
unchecked, would “also affect our domestic competitive climate”;21 and 
(b) the investing public has the right to know whether they are investing in 
corporations that have engaged in unethical conduct. That access to the 
relatively cheap money, readily available in U.S. capital markets (i.e., via 
the issuance of stocks, private bonds, or other debt instruments, etc.), 
should be limited to companies that do not engage in less than competitive 
behavior seems to strike a fair capitalistic bargain.  
Since its enactment, the FCPA has undergone several amendments. 
Most notably, in 1988, Congress added several affirmative defenses (e.g., 
“lawful payment,” “reasonable and bona fide expenditure,” etc.),22 made 
the mens rea requirement stricter (i.e., requiring knowledge rather than 
recklessness),23 and expanded the legislative record to further broaden the 
meaning of some original statutory provisions (e.g., clarifying the meaning 
of “retaining business,” etc.).24 At the same time, Congress reviewed and 
increased the formal penalties for violating the anti-bribery provisions.25 A 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101.  
 18. 13 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRES. DOC. 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977); see also Mark Romaneski, 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An Analysis of Its Impact and Future, 5 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 405, 405 n.2; Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of title 15 of the United States Code). 
 19. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (issuers’ duty to report), 78dd-1(issuers), -2 (domestic concerns), -3 
(any person), 78ff (other penalties) (2000)). 
 20. See Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Unnecessary 
Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861, 869 n.57 (2001) (citing Robert S. Levy, Note, The 
Antibribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Are They Really As Valuable As 
We Think They Are?, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 82 (1985). 
 21. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101 (“Foreign 
corporate bribes also affect our domestic competitive climate when domestic firms engage in such 
practices as a substitute for healthy competition for foreign business.”).  
 22. H.R. REP. NO. 100-418, at 921–23 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1949, 1954–56. The conference agreement defined “lawful payment” as “a payment to a foreign 
official [that] is ‘lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s country.’” Id. at 
1955 (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. at 919, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1952. 
 24. Id. at 918, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1951. 
 25. Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtitle A, pt. I, § 5003(b), 102 Stat. 1415, 1419 (1988).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/2
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civil fine of up to $10,000 was introduced as a possible sanction,26 and the 
maximum criminal fine for a U.S. corporation was increased from $1 
million to $2 million.27 Finally, in late 1998, the FCPA was updated to 
conform to the new OECD Convention.28  
B. FCPA’s Framework 
The FCPA places several duties on American corporations, 
businessmen and their agents. The statute prohibits both companies and 
natural persons from offering, promising to offer, or authorizing the 
payment of money, a “gift,” or anything of value to a foreign official for 
the purpose of securing influence, inaction, or a contract to obtain or 
maintain business.29 Furthermore, since 1998 the FCPA has applied to any 
foreign entity or foreign national who commits an act in furtherance of a 
foreign bribe while in U.S. territory.30 In addition, U.S.-registered 
security-issuing corporations31 (i.e., “issuers”) subject to SEC regulation 
have the additional duty to comply with SEC accounting and record-
keeping requirements for disclosing their payments.32  
The antibribery provisions of the FCPA can be broken down into three 
separate segments: (a) one applying to issuers (i.e., thus subject to civil 
enforcement through the SEC);33 (b) one applying to domestic concerns 
(i.e., subject to civil and criminal enforcement by the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”));34 and (c) a catchall provision applying to anyone who 
 26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), 78ff(c)(2)(A) (2000). 
 27. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A). 
 28. See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2000). 
 30. See id. § 77dd-3 (“Prohibited foreign trade practices by persons other than issuers or 
domestic concerns”). Congress extended statutory coverage to this category of individuals pursuant to 
the U.S. efforts to bring FCPA in compliance with the OECD Convention. See discussion infra Part 
III.B.  
 31. An “issuer” is a business entity that either (a) has a class of securities registered under 
Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or (b) is required to file reports pursuant to Section 
15(d) of the same Act. 48 Stat. 881 (June 6, 1934), codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 77b, et seq.  
 32. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2004). These record-keeping/disclosure requirements 
create only corporate, not criminal liability. See Low & McGlone, supra note 5, at 136. These 
provisions are beyond the scope of this article.  
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000). See also S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4109 (“When the SEC believes it has compiled enough evidence for a criminal 
action, it refers the case to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.”).  
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2000). The statute explains: 
For purposes of this section: 
(1) the term “domestic concern” means— 
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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does not fall under either of the other two categories.35 Much of the 
language between the three segments is identical, and none of the 
differences are significant for the purposes of this Article. 
1. Jurisdiction of the FCPA 
The FCPA sets forth two separate bases for jurisdiction: (a) the 
standard territorial jurisdiction (i.e., jurisdiction resulting from some act 
that establishes a nexus between the bribery and the United States 
territory, thus triggering the U.S. territorial power to adjudicate);36 and (2) 
the more recently added (1998) nationality principle (i.e., jurisdiction 
based on the U.S. nationality of an individual or legal person).37  
Traditionally, any act requiring the use of the mails or any other 
instrumentality of interstate commerce in the course of bribing a foreign 
official would trigger liability under the FCPA.38 This included engaging 
in efforts to corrupt a foreign official while on international travel, making 
an international telephone call, sending a fax, or even an e-mail.39 Thus, it 
was nearly impossible to engage in any foreign official bribery without 
violating the statute. Because this element is so easily met, counsel should 
advise clients about the need to approach with great care any conduct that 
could potentially evolve to or be interpreted as bribery.40  
Yet, despite its breadth, the usual cautionary warning is no longer 
comprehensive enough. Congress, in 1998, expanded the jurisdiction of 
the FCPA by prohibiting any U.S. corporation, business, or persons that 
are nationals of the United States from bribing any foreign official 
anywhere,41 regardless of whether any part of the conduct involved an 
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, 
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business 
in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a 
territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States. 
Id. § 78dd-2(h). See also S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4109-
10 (“Under the bill, the Justice Department retains sole investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction 
over domestic concerns covered but which are not otherwise within the jurisdiction of the SEC.”).  
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2000) (“Prohibited foreign trade practices by persons other than issuers 
or domestic concerns”).  
 36. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a). 
 37. See id. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i) (“Alternative jurisdiction”).  
 38. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), dd-2(a), dd-3(a). See also id. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5), 78dd-3(f)(5) (definition of 
“interstate commerce.”).  
 39. See id. §§ 78dd-2(h)(5), -3(f)(5).  
 40. See Dep’t of Comm., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, 
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/fcp1.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2006). 
 41. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), -2(i) (2000).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/2
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instrumentality of interstate commerce.42 Indeed, U.S. citizens, nationals, 
and even residents are now all bound by the FCPA, just as corporations 
incorporated within the United States43 and corporations subject to SEC 
regulation. Thus, the FCPA reach now goes well beyond the already broad 
jurisdictional requirement that a legal or natural person use an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce to procure the bribery of a foreign 
official.  
2. Mens Rea 
At the core of the FCPA is the prohibition of making a “corrupt” 
payment to a foreign official. The three prongs of the statute address (a) 
U.S. issuers anywhere, (b) domestic concerns anywhere, and (c) all others 
(i.e., other U.S. persons anywhere, and foreign entities’ or individuals’ 
acts while in U.S. territory). Each prong prohibits a person from 
“corruptly” making a bribe,44 but none provides a definition of “corruptly” 
or “corrupt.”45 The legislative history does, however, provide some 
guidance. It explains that the use of the word “corruptly” embodies the 
quid pro quo nature of the transaction: the briber gives something of value 
with the expectation of influencing the foreign official “to wrongfully 
direct business to the payor or his client.”46  
This also explains why the FCPA only criminalizes those corrupt 
exchanges that are done knowingly.47 With respect to what constitutes 
“knowing,” the legislative history is very clear: merely pretending to look 
away (i.e., willful blindness) does not work.48 However, despite providing 
a definition of what constitutes a “knowing” state of mind, the terms 
 42. For a discussion of why a U.S. resident would be covered by the statute, see Low & 
McGlone, supra note 5, at 176 n.12. 
 43. Congress extended statutory coverage to this category of individuals pursuant to the U.S. 
efforts to bring FCPA in compliance with the OECD Convention. See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2000). 
 45. See id.  
 46. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108. See also 
Klich, supra note 15; accord Stanley S. Arkin, et al., Business Crime: Criminal Liability of the 
Business Community, 18.04, 18-17 to 18-18 (Matthew Bender 1990).  
 47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2), -2(h)(3), -3(f)(3) (2000). 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 920 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 
1953 (“If . . . a defendant act[s] with reckless disregard [with respect to the occurrence of bribery] and 
with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, the requirement of knowledge would be satisfied 
unless the defendant actually believed [that such conduct is not bribery].”) (quoting United States v. 
Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 n.37 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied sub nom. Lavelle v. United States, 414 U.S. 
821 (1973)). See also discussion infra Part IV.A (describing a situation where reasonable diligence 
would be required, and, thus, willful blindness would be ineffective) and note 151 (containing 
additional quotation from the legislative record).  
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employed by the statute (e.g., “substantially likely to occur,” “firm belief,” 
etc.) leave attorneys and courts with ample room for interpretation.49 Here, 
a more cautious approach is in order because corporations are especially 
vulnerable due to the application of vicarious liability. For example, a 
corporation can be prosecuted and held liable, even without having any 
direct knowledge of the offense, if it is closely affiliated with a subsidiary 
that has knowledge. In such instances, the law will impute the knowledge 
to the parent corporation.50  
3. Restricted Conduct 
The FCPA restricts any quid pro quo trade of something of value in 
exchange for influence over the decision-making process of a foreign 
official,51 foreign political party, foreign political party official, or a 
candidate for a foreign political office in the pursuit of obtaining or 
retaining business.52 Specifically, the term “foreign official” means any 
employee of a foreign government or of a public international 
organization, or any individual acting on behalf of any such entity.53 In 
addition, the FCPA prohibits knowingly giving anything of value to a third 
party who will pass all or part of the value to a foreign official, foreign 
political party, foreign political party official, or a candidate for a foreign 
political office.54 
In terms of what transactions are prohibited, the FCPA is written 
broadly to include any payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of any money, gift, or anything of value.55 Notably, the statute 
 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Taylor, supra note 20, at 874 (citing Stephen F. Black & Roger M. Witten, Complying with 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, § 1.01, in 1 BUSINESS LAW MONOGRAPHS, INTERNATIONAL 
SERIES 3–6 (2000)). Note, however, that the FCPA’s mens rea requirement still leaves open the 
possibility of a defense of innocent intentions, i.e., that the defendant was acting under an erroneous 
belief that the activities were not bribery. In such circumstances, however, reliance upon the advice of 
counsel would be highly probative of a defendant’s intent. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c), -2(c), -3(c) 
(2000). See also discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), -2(a)(1) (2000). 
 52. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), -2(a)(2). 
 53. Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A). With the adoption of the OECD Convention, 
officials of public international organizations have also been included in FCPA. See International Anti-
Bribery Act of 1998, H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, pt. 3, at 9 (1998). For purposes of U.S. law, public 
international organizations are only those entities that have been so designated by Executive Order 
pursuant to Section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-291 
(Dec. 29, 1945) (22 U.S.C. § 288, et seq.).  
 54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3) (2000). 
 55. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a). 
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does not require a completed transaction. Simply making a corrupt offer, 
or even authorizing someone to make a corrupt offer, violates the FCPA.56 
The element that makes the actions in the FCPA illegal is the purpose 
of the transaction. The transaction must be made for the purpose of 
influencing an act or decision of a foreign official in his official capacity, 
including the decision not to act, or to have the foreign official influence 
the decisions of another foreign official or government entity.57 It is 
equally prohibited to engage in a transaction to “secure an improper 
advantage.”58 Notably, the purpose of the transaction must be to secure 
influence “in order to assist the [briber] in obtaining or retaining 
business.”59  
It should be clear by now that the FCPA defines foreign corruption 
very broadly, but it is not without its limits. In particular, the 1988 
amendments to the FCPA were designed to create some limits to the 
FCPA so that businesses were not unduly hindered by the restrictions. The 
next Part will address the boundaries of the FCPA. 
4. Limitations of the FCPA  
There are three major exceptions to the general prohibitions in the 
FCPA: (a) grease payments;60 (b) legitimate business marketing;61 and (c) 
payments permitted by the written laws of the foreign country.62 
The grease-payment exception permits payments to governmental 
officials intended to hasten the completion of a non-discretionary “routine 
governmental action.”63 Routine governmental actions are those functions 
for which the official has no decision-making authority.64 Paying money to 
accelerate processing of paperwork is thought of as the classic example.65 
The statute defines a few tasks as “routine,” but also contains a catchall 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), -2(a)(1). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. See also discussion infra Part I.B.4 (discussing FCPA’s limitations).  
 60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2000). 
 61. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2). 
 62. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1). 
 63. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B). 
 64.  
The term “routine governmental action” does not include any decision by a foreign official 
whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a particular 
party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to 
encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party. 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B); see also id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), -3(f)(4)(B). 
 65. Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)-(ii), -2(h)(3)(A)(i)-(ii), -3(f)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).  
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provision.66 The distinction between decision-making and mandatory 
authority is anything but clear. Some commentators argue that moving an 
application to the top of the pile is in itself exercising decision-making 
authority.67 An even more difficult question arises when a payment is 
made to expedite a matter that involves some future determination; e.g., 
the application must be reviewed for completeness before processing.68 
Although the payment may only have been intended to expedite the 
process, it is impossible to prove the purpose of such a payment after the 
fact. Or, more troubling, although the intent of the payment may have been 
only to expedite a process, the foreign official may have interpreted the 
payment as having a dual meaning.  
The legitimate business exception is an affirmative defense available 
under the FCPA.69 It permits businesses to expend money to educate 
government officials about their company, product, etc.70 A company can 
reimburse foreign officials for expenses incurred to promote, demonstrate, 
or explain a product, or to execute or perform on a contract. The classic 
example of this exception is a company paying for a government official 
to visit a production factory or worksite. The outer boundaries of this 
exception are not without confusion. For instance, how long can a trip last 
before it turns into a vacation, and can the company pay for the family to 
travel with the official? 
 66. The FCPA defines the performance of the following tasks as “routine governmental action”:  
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business 
in a foreign country;  
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;  
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections 
associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country;  
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo, or 
protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or 
(iv) actions of a similar nature. 
Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A). 
 67. JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HUSISIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 44 n.67 (1997); see Taylor, supra note 20, 
at 875. 
 68. Taylor, supra note 20, at 876. 
 69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2) (2000). 
 70. The statute reads in pertinent part: 
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) of this section that— 
(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a reasonable 
and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a 
foreign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly related to— 
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or 
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.  
Id. §§ 78dd-1(c), -2(c), -3(c). 
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The last exception came as a concession to those who argued that the 
FCPA unfairly disadvantaged American businesses in foreign countries. 
Pursuant to this affirmative defense, the FCPA is inapplicable when a 
country permits bribes in its legal code.71 Notably, the exception requires 
that the law be written,72 which is rarely the case. Typically, countries that 
accept bribery do so by not outlawing bribes. Some countries may not 
codify permission because they view longstanding customs as law.73 
However, these practices fall short of the FCPA requirement that the law 
be written. Corporations and individuals subject to FCPA coverage are 
well advised not to neglect narrowness of this exception.  
In addition to these obvious exceptions, there is another limitation in 
the language of the statute that is often overlooked. For the bribe to be 
actionable under the statute, the bribe must be made for the purpose of 
obtaining or retaining business.74 While a reading of the legislative history 
regarding the 1988 amendments reflects a congressional intent that the 
statute be read broadly to proscribe payments for the purpose of gaining 
influence with a foreign official,75 the operative test under the statute is 
whether such “payments [are] intended to assist the payor, either directly 
or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person.”76  
Specifically, a prosecutor will satisfy the “business nexus”77 test only 
by demonstrating that the payment at issue was intended “to assist in 
obtaining or retaining business.”78 Under United States v. Kay, where the 
prosecution did benefit from the court’s adoption of a broad reading of the 
 71. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1). 
 72. Id. 
 73. One commentary suggested that the FCPA needs to be expanded to recognize conduct 
consistent with “customary law” as a permissible exception to the anti-bribery provisions. Taylor, 
supra note 20, at 877.  
 74. “It shall be unlawful [to give gifts, etc. to a foreign official] in order to assist such domestic 
concern in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-2(a)(1) (2004). Identical language is found in sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-3.  
 75. H.R. REP. NO. 100-418, at 918 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 
1951. 
 76. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ribes paid to foreign tax 
officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall 
within [the] broad coverage [of FCPA].”). 
 77. Id. at 743. 
 78. Id. at 755. In rejecting a narrow defense interpretation of “business,” however, the Fifth 
Circuit noted that “business” need not be restricted to business opportunities with the government, but 
extends to business activities within a foreign country that may be aided by obtaining a competitive 
advantage by bribing a foreign official. See id. at 756 (“[B]y narrowly defining exceptions and 
affirmative defenses against a backdrop of broad applicability, Congress reaffirmed its intention for 
the statute to apply to payments that even indirectly assist in obtaining business or maintaining existing 
business operations in a foreign country.”) (emphasis added). 
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statute,79 merely showing that a defendant obtained beneficial treatment by 
bribing a foreign official will not suffice. Simply put, the business nexus 
test acts as another limitation on the application of FCPA to foreign 
official bribes. This limitation, however, is tempered by a broad 
interpretation of the term “business” that looks to whether the payment of 
a bribe was intended as a means of securing a competitive advantage that 
would result in obtaining or retaining business with any person within a 
foreign country, not only with governmental parties.80 
As a final note, although not a formal part of the law, the DOJ has been 
noted to rely upon advice of local counsel in its decision to initiate 
proceedings for violations of the FCPA.81 Obviously, this element would 
factor into the mens rea requirement, particularly in the context of the 
requirement that the act be “corrupt.” If a person were acting under the 
advice of counsel, it would strongly suggest that he was not attempting to 
engage in a corrupt activity. However, advice of counsel never should be 
considered relevant for the defense of legality under local law, because 
that affirmative defense is only available when the law is written. Whether 
or not a person had advice of counsel would have no bearing on the actual 
state of the law in the country in question.  
C. Enforcement 
The FCPA is enforced through civil and criminal mechanisms. 
Violators can be subject to fines and imprisonment. An individual can be 
subject to fines as high as $100,000 and a prison term of up to five years.82 
For corporations, fines can be as high as two million dollars.83 In the civil 
realm, the government can seek prospective injunctions to prohibit a 
person from making an illegal bribe84 and a civil penalty of up to 
$10,000.85 Fines imposed against officers, directors, employees, agents, or 
stockholders of corporations may not be paid directly or indirectly by the 
corporation.86  
 79. Id. at 748 (“We conclude that the legislative intent was so broad.”).  
 80. See supra note 78. 
 81. Taylor, supra note 20, at 882–83. 
 82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), -3(e)(2)(A) (2000). 
 83. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), -3(e)(1)(A). 
 84. Id. §§ 78dd-2(d), -3(d). 
 85. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), -2(g)(2)(B), -3(e)(1)(B), -3(e)(2)(B). 
 86. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g)(3), 78ff(c)(3). 
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The DOJ and the SEC jointly enforce the FCPA.87 The SEC primarily 
enforces the FCPA through the accounting requirements placed upon 
regulated corporations,88 while the Attorney General (“AG”) enforces the 
anti-bribery provisions.89 The SEC is generally responsible for enforcing 
civil actions against issuers,90 although the AG is also authorized to do 
so.91 The DOJ is the only agency capable of obtaining prospective 
injunctions.92 It should be noted that corporations are rarely prosecuted for 
FCPA violations. The few times that FCPA charges have been brought, 
they were an add-on to a lengthier indictment related to more serious 
offenses.93  
In addition to the traditional prosecutorial role of the DOJ, it also 
serves an advisory function by providing FCPA opinions to companies 
regarding the propriety of a prospective transaction.94 The AG will issue 
opinions only on prospective, as opposed to hypothetical or completed 
conduct.95 The opinion has binding force, with some limits. For example, 
an AG opinion creates a rebuttable presumption that conduct consistent 
with the opinion did not violate the FCPA.96 However, the AG can defeat 
that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.97 The opinion binds 
only the parties that joined in the request98 and the DOJ.99 This last 
exception is notable because the SEC is expressly excluded from being 
bound to the opinion.100 This raises the question of how useful the FCPA 
opinion is in practice.101  
 87. S. REP. NO. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 
4109-10.  
 88. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (“Every issuer of a security . . . shall file with the Commission 
. . . .”) 
 89. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g), -3(e), 78ff(c).  
 90. Stephen J. DeCosse & Susan S. Katcher, Newly Amended Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 63 
WIS. LAW. 23, 61 (1990).  
 91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), -2(g)(2)(B), -3(e)(1)(B), -3(e)(2)(B) (2000). 
 92. Id. §§ 78dd-2(d), -3(d). 
 93. Bruce Zagaris, Avoiding Criminal Liability in the Conduct of International Business, 21 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 760 (1996). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 77dd-1(e) (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2005).  
 95. 28 C.F.R. § 80.3 (2005).  
 96. Id. § 80.10 (2005).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 80.5. 
 99. Id. §§ 80.10, 80.11. 
 100. Id. § 80.12. 
 101. Since the creation of the review opinion process, only twenty-three requests have been made 
to the DOJ. See Decosse & Katcher, supra note 90, at 61 (noting only twenty opinions as of 1990); 
FCPA Op. No. 01-03, 2001 WL 34059037 (DOJ FCPA); FCPA Op. No. 98-02, 1998 WL 34068169 
(DOJ FCPA); FCPA Op. No. 92-01, 1992 WL 12005339 (DOJ FCPA). More telling, in the past fifteen 
years, there have only been three requests made. See FCPA Op. No. 01-03, 2001 WL 34059037 (DOJ 
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II. BRIBING FOREIGN OFFICIALS MAY TRIGGER MONEY MOVEMENT 
OFFENSES AND OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES BEYOND THE FCPA 
U.S. corporations engaging in business abroad must take into account 
various federal statutes that have both civil and criminal provisions. When 
U.S. persons or corporations make financial transactions that are for or 
connected to illegal transactions, such as bribing a foreign official, a 
related number of criminal laws also may be violated. These and other 
laws should be considered as a checklist when counsel is requested to 
advise on payments to officials to obtain contracts, as well as in preparing 
financial statements to obtain loans, tax planning, and responding to 
potentially irregular or suspicious transactions.102 The list below offers a 
brief, nonexhaustive summary of federal statutes that may be applicable in 
instances of bribery.  
A. “Money Laundering” and Engaging in Monetary Transactions in 
Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity 
Sections 1956 and 1957 of Title 18 of the United States Code comprise 
the federal money laundering statutes. These sections criminalize four 
distinct transactions: (a) money laundering;103 (b) international monetary 
transfers with a criminal intent;104 (c) “sting” offenses;105 and (d) monetary 
FCPA); FCPA Op. No. 98-02, 1998 WL 34068169 (DOJ FCPA); FCPA Op. No. 92-01, 1992 WL 
12005339 (DOJ FCPA). The low request number suggests that companies may not find the opinion 
process helpful. See generally BUSINESS LAWS INC., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER 
(Supp. 112, July 2005).  
 102. See discussion infra Part III.B and note 53.  
 103. The statute provides in pertinent part: 
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the 
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct a financial 
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity— 
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying of specified unlawful activity; or 
 (ii) with the intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or 
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part— 
 (i)to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control 
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
 (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,  
shall be sentenced to [fine or imprisonment]. 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000).  
 104. The statute reads in pertinent part: 
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a 
monetary instrument or funds from a place outside the United States or to a place in the 
United States from or through a place outside the United States— 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/2
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transactions involving criminal proceeds exceeding $10,000.106 Of 
particular concern for our purposes are the prohibitions on monetary 
transactions designed to avoid a reporting requirement. Because the FCPA 
contains reporting requirements for SEC regulated entities,107 transfers 
related to a violation of the FCPA would likely also be designed to 
circumvent the reporting requirements. Also notable is the prohibition 
contained in subsection 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii), which relates to international 
monetary transfers, the typical vehicle for paying a foreign bribe.108 
B. Bribing and Other Federal Statutes 
While bribing or attempting to bribe a foreign official, a U.S. 
individual or corporation may trigger several federal statutes, whose 
applicability will depend on the specific circumstances of the particular 
bribing incident. The following is a nonexhaustive list: mail fraud;109 wire 
fraud;110 the “Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act”;111 the 
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or 
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, 
transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and 
knowing that such transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in part— 
 (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control 
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
 (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,  
shall be sentenced to [fine or imprisonment]. 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (2000). Similar to § 1956(a)(1), this section is most relevant for its prohibition 
on international money transfers designed to circumvent federal reporting requirements. 
 105. The statute provides in pertinent part: 
Whoever, with the intent— 
(A) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; 
(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, source, ownership, or control of property 
believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or 
(C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, conducts or 
attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property represented to be the proceeds 
of specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or facilitate specified unlawful 
activity, shall be [subject to fine and imprisonment]. 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (2000). 
 106. “Whoever [as a United States citizen or while within the territories of the United States], 
knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a 
value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b).” 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2000). 
 107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 109. Id. § 1341 (criminalizing the use of U.S. Postal Service or private interstate carrier in 
connection with a fraudulent scheme).  
 110. Id. § 1343 (criminalizing the use of wire communications in connection with a fraudulent 
scheme). 
 111. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000) (requiring all transportation of currency in excess of $10,000 to be 
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“Internal Revenue Code”;112 and the “False Statements Act”;113 and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.114  
C. A Note of Caution 
Parts I and II not only summarize the full breadth of the FCPA, but also 
showed how bribing foreign officials can trigger a number of other 
predicate federal criminal offenses. In view of the undisputed moral 
argument against bribery, any U.S. corporation that conducts even a small 
amount of business overseas will benefit from having a formal, written 
anti-bribery policy. This company policy should lay out procedures that 
aid its directors, officers, employees, agents, and even stockholders to 
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate proposals, and payments 
and gifts to the different foreign officials covered by the statute.  
U.S. companies’ need for cautious conduct in their foreign transactions 
is particularly heightened now that other developed (and some less 
developed) countries have ratified the OECD Convention Against Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials (“OECD Convention”). By expanding the 
applicability of anti-foreign bribery laws to major international 
competitors of U.S. companies, the OECD Convention has further 
reinforced this call for caution. 
III. THE OECD CONVENTION AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS IN U.S. LAW 
A. The Convention 
Pursuant to article 15, paragraph 1, the OECD Convention entered into 
force on February 15, 1999, sixty days after Canada (the fifth among 
reported to the United States Treasury). See Zagaris, supra note 93, at 779.  
 112. U.S. corporate taxpayers may not deduct bribes that are illegal under the FCPA. See I.R.C. 
§ 162(c)(1), which states: 
No deduction shall be allowed . . . for any payment made, directly or indirectly, to an official 
or employee of any government, or of any agency or instrumentality of any government, if 
the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if the payment is to an official or 
employee of a foreign government, the payment is unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977. 
Id. Notably, where any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockbroker of a U.S. company is fined 
for violating the FCPA, the U.S. company may not pay the fine or reimburse the individual who has 
been fined. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(3) (2000).  
 113. This statute prescribes criminal penalties for persons or corporations that “knowingly make 
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements, or submit fraudulent documents to any department or agency 
of the United States government.” Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1001).  
 114. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7211 (2000) (establishing and authorizing Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board to enforce accounting standards).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/2
p  1 Colares book pages.doc2/28/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST CORRUPTION 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
member-countries with the largest ten export shares) deposited its 
instrument of ratification.115 The Convention requires, among other things, 
that signatories: 
(1) adopt anti-bribery legislation barring the bribery of public 
officials to obtain or retain any improper advantage in the conduct 
of international business;116  
(2) criminalize or create civil liability for bribing public officials;117 
and  
(3) require companies to keep accurate books and records to stymie 
efforts to conceal corrupt payments.118  
The OECD Convention addressed two problems that previously had 
affected FCPA enforcement: the question of jurisdiction119 and the issue of 
cooperation in extraditing and prosecuting offenders.120  
Regarding jurisdiction, the OECD Convention prescribed that 
signatories shall assert jurisdiction both over acts committed within their 
boundaries and over its citizens accused of engaging in proscribed conduct 
anywhere.121 This represents a significant departure from the FCPA’s 
territorially based approach to jurisdiction.122 That approach had required 
the use of the mail or an instrumentality of interstate commerce in 
furtherance of a foreign bribe as a nexus for asserting jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts. This significant change raises the stakes for U.S. companies 
operating abroad. They now have to monitor compliance not only with an 
eye to territorially-based acts, but also with respect to conduct by any U.S. 
party anywhere in the world.  
By requiring multilateral cooperation in the extradition and prosecution 
of offenders, the OECD Convention also has simplified significantly the 
investigatory hurdles the DOJ previously faced when dealing with 
 115. The other four countries were Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The status of ratification and implementation is provided at the OECD’s website, http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/59/13/1898632.pdf (last visited on Nov. 9, 2005). As of November 9, 2005, thirty-six 
countries had deposited their instruments of ratification, among which, only Slovenia was still 
expected to enact legislation implementing the Convention.  
 116. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1.  
 117. Id.; see also arts. 2, 3, para. 1.  
 118. Id. art. 8, para. 1.  
 119. Id. art. 4, paras. 1, 2.  
 120. Id. art. 10.  
 121. Id. art. 1, para. 4(a). 
 122. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.  
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uncooperative countries.123 More importantly, at least with respect to 
signatory countries, this approach eliminates two basic defenses to 
extradition: (a) that there is no extradition treaty; and (b) that the offense 
charged is not extraditable under a preexisting treaty.124  
B. Domestic Repercussions 
In July 1998, the Senate approved both the OECD Convention and the 
implementing legislation.125 Congress completed action on implementing 
legislation in October 1998.126 The President signed the implementing 
legislation on November 10, 1998 and the ratification instrument on 
November 20, 1998.127 The United States deposited its instrument of 
ratification with the OECD Secretary-General on December 8, 1998.128  
Adoption of the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 
1998129 brought the United States in conformity with the Convention.130 
The 1998 Amendments expanded the FCPA in several areas: (1) the class 
of prohibited conduct; (2) extraterritorial jurisdiction over domestic 
companies and nationals;131 (3) jurisdiction over foreign companies and 
nationals; and (4) the application of criminal sanctions against natural 
persons regardless of nationality. These amendments sought to close 
loopholes that had handicapped FCPA enforcement in the past.132  
First, before the 1998 amendments, a corrupt act was defined as a 
payment to a foreign official, foreign political parties, party officials, and 
candidates for the purpose of (i) influencing any act or decision of such 
person or party in their official capacity, or (ii) inducing such person or 
party to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such 
 123. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 9. 
 124. Article 10, paragraph 2 establishes that “a Party which makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of an extradition treaty . . . may consider this Convention to be the legal basis for extradition 
in respect of the offence of bribery of a foreign public official.” Id. art. 10, para. 2. 
 125. See Steps Taken and Planned Future Actions by Participating Countries to Ratify and 
Implement the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD BRIBERY CONVENTION: STATUS OF RATIFICATION 1, 77 (2001), http://www. 
oecd.org/dataoecd/50/33/1827022.pdf (last visited on Nov. 9, 2005) (“Steps Taken and Planned Future 
Actions—Submissions as of 12 November 2004”).  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 2375, 
112 Stat. 3302 (1998).  
 130. See Deming, supra note 12, at 512. 
 131. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 132. For a more detailed discussion of each of these changes, see Deming, supra note 12.  
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official or party.133 That definition has been amended and broadened to 
contemplate a payment to a foreign official to secure any improper 
advantage.134  
Second, besides expanding the jurisdictional basis for liability of U.S. 
companies and nationals, the 1998 Amendments also created a new basis 
for civil and criminal penalties by imposing liability on any person, 
defined as “any foreign national or company that is not an issuer and does 
not have a principal place of business in the U.S., who commits any act in 
the U.S. utilizing the U.S. mails or other instrument of interstate 
commerce in furtherance of an unlawful, foreign bribe.”135 This means that 
a single act committed in the United States by a foreign non-resident 
national could now subject a foreign company with no U.S. operations to 
FCPA liability. On the other hand, a wholly owned foreign subsidiary that 
acts completely outside the United States in furthering a foreign bribe is 
still not subject to FCPA liability if the U.S. parent does not take any part 
in the proscribed conduct.136  
Finally, the 1998 Amendments eliminated a previous disparity in 
sanctions against U.S. and foreign nationals who are employees or agents 
of a domestic company.137 Previously, only U.S. nationals and permanent 
residents were subject to both civil and criminal sanctions, while foreign 
non-resident nationals were subject only to civil penalties.138 Since 1998, 
all individuals are subject to both types of sanctions.139 As I discussed 
earlier,140 criminal sanctions include imprisonment for up to five years and 
fines of up $100,000 for individuals, or two million dollars for 
corporations.141  
IV. SOME BRIBERY SCENARIOS AND SOME PUZZLING QUESTIONS 
As the foregoing parts indicate, the legitimate concern with combating 
bribery, first by the United States, and later by OECD members, has 
culminated with the proscription by more than thirty countries of the 
bribing of foreign officials. But these statutes can be very broad, and the 
 133. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1997).  
 134. Id. § 78dd-1(a) (2000).  
 135. Id. § 78dd-2(a).  
 136. The U.S. company, however, could be held liable if an agency relationship or other form of 
vicarious liability (e.g., respondeat superior) is established.  
 137. See Deming, supra note 12, at 514. 
 138. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (1997).  
 139. Id. § 78dd-2(g) (2000).  
 140. See discussion supra Part I.B.1 and accompanying notes. 
 141. See id.  
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incentives for going forward with a highly profitable transaction 
frequently lead to “rationalizations” that may stretch concepts as fluid as, 
say, “grease payments” beyond reasonable bounds. It is no surprise, then, 
that attorneys are frequently under enormous pressure142 from their clients 
to provide an unqualified legal opinion that a particular course of action 
will not lead to violations, despite the ethical caveat that “[a] lawyer shall 
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”143 
In areas where an attorney cannot render a clean opinion, corporate 
officers may face a difficult choice between losing a major sale and 
running the risk, even if limited, of a criminal violation. This tension 
between personal risk and corporate gain could create potential conflicts of 
interest between the corporation and its officers, and for the attorneys who 
represent them.144 Certainly, issues under the FCPA and the OECD 
Convention raise questions of liability both for the company and its 
responsible officers—a situation which does not necessarily, but may raise 
conflict problems.145 
As we consider the following hypothetical situations ((A)-(C)), it is 
worth keeping in mind the scope of the lawyer’s role as advisor:  
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering 
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political 
factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.146 
 142. This pressure may be exponentially heightened in situations where counsel is licensed to 
practice law in a foreign jurisdiction, since the DOJ has noted that a factor in its decision to prosecute 
is whether the domestic concern was acting under advice of local counsel when it engaged in the 
questionable conduct. Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861, 877 (2001).  
 143. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).  
 144. Panel discussion on Solving Your Clients’ Sanctions and Export Control Problems, William 
L. Clements, Lucinda A. Low, J. Scott Maberry, O’Neil Woelke, panelists, in GEORGETOWN UNIV. 
LAW CTR., INTERNATIONAL TRADE UPDATE 2004: TRENDS, TIPS AND PRACTICAL ADVICE 136 (Jan. 
29–30, 2004) (on file with author).  
 145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(g) (2002). This rule generally permits a 
lawyer to represent both an organization and any of its directors, officers, members, etc., subject to 
Rule 1.7. Rule 1.7 generally prohibits a lawyer from representing a client “if the representation of that 
client will be directly adverse to another client.” Id. R. 1.7(a)(1) (2002).  
 146. Id. R. 2.1 (2002) (emphasis added). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-
8 (1983) (“Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations.”).  
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A. Hypothetical Situation: What is a Commission, What is a Bribe?  
A U.S. manufacturer of irrigation valves is asked to supply a 
Ruritanian147 corporation with $500,000 worth of valves, an order that 
would represent thirty percent of the U.S. company’s yearly sales. The 
U.S. manufacturer’s Ruritanian “agent,” a private party, requests that a 
commercial invoice of $600,000 be presented with the goods to the 
ultimate customer (the Ruritanian agricultural development agency), and 
that the U.S. company, once it receives payment, deposit $100,000 of the 
proceeds—a “commission”—in a numbered Swiss bank account.148 The 
sales manager for the U.S. company is aware that the normal commission 
for such transaction is between two and five percent of the invoiced value, 
and is aware that an abnormally high commission can trigger a “red flag” 
under the company’s FCPA compliance procedures. 
It is not clear whether the recipient of these funds is a private or a 
foreign official. Thus, the client would not know whether this is a 
commission or a bribe. Being aware of how this sale so clearly affects his 
client, how should counsel to the U.S. manufacturer advise his client?  
At first, this example appears to present a straightforward decision 
because the facts and legal issues are easily ascertainable, and they point 
against going ahead with the transaction for a number of reasons. First, as 
discussed above,149 the term “knowing” includes “conscious disregard and 
deliberate ignorance” and will not insulate a corporation from prosecution 
under the FCPA.150 A reasonable level of diligence thus is required and, 
should this transaction be investigated, it would be very hard to 
demonstrate that the client “actually believed” no bribery was involved.151 
 147. Although I am assuming that Ruritania is a less developed country, I do not hold the naïve 
view that government official corruption only occurs in these countries.  
 148. The use of a Swiss bank account to further an alleged bribery operation is one of the elements 
of recent SEC civil injunctive action before the Southern District of New York. See SEC v. Joshua C. 
Cantor, Civil Action No. 03 CV 2499 (LMM) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003). Among other charges, the 
SEC alleges that the defendant “violated the anti-bribery provisions of the federal securities laws by 
causing [his former employer] to pay $239,000 to a Swiss bank account for the purpose of influencing 
or affecting the acts or decisions of one or more Saudi Arabian officials . . . to assist [his former 
employer] in obtaining or retaining business with that government.” U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Litigation Release No. 18081 (Apr. 10, 2003), available at htpp://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/lr18081.htm. The factors in this hypothetical are in no way related to this case.  
 149. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 150. See Dep’t of Comm., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, supra note 40.  
 151. See H.R. REP. NO. 576, supra note 48, at 920. See also id. at 1954. 
[K]nowledge of a fact may be inferred where the defendant has notice of the high probability 
of the existence of the fact and has failed to establish an honest, contrary disbelief. The 
inference cannot be overcome by the defendant’s “deliberate avoidance of knowledge,” his or 
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Second, though no foreign official is directly involved or even mentioned, 
a twenty percent commission is highly suspicious, especially because the 
client has paid much lower commissions, and counsel knows that willful 
ignorance will not suffice as a defense to foreign bribery, particularly 
where such discrepancies are involved.152 Third, the use of an unnamed, 
numbered Swiss bank account, while decreasing the risk of detection in 
Ruritania and possibly in the United States, will implicate the client if this 
transaction triggers an investigation. It creates an aura of secretiveness and 
suspicion.153  
From a practical standpoint, however, this decision is more 
complicated due to the potential gains from this transaction (i.e., thirty 
percent of the company’s sales in a year). The client may be strongly 
dissuaded from heeding counsel’s sound legal advice, and, worse, the 
circumstances may cause the client to think counsel is too risk-averse or 
merely trying to protect himself from liability. These perceptions can 
strain significantly the relationship between the client and his attorney, 
thus creating perverse incentives for the latter to issue an opinion advising 
the client to obtain assurances from the Ruritanian agent that the 
commission money will not be siphoned off to local authorities and that it 
is reasonably related to his activities as an agent. The business efficacy of 
this opinion, however, is questionable, for it is doubtful that the agent will 
agree to such stipulations.  
B. Hypothetical Situation: What Is Missing When Paying a Bribe Is 
Defined Only as Making a Payment or Conferring an Advantage to a 
Foreign Public Official?  
A U.S. citizen managing a wholly-owned Ruritanian subsidiary of a 
U.S. information technology company is approached by the head of the 
local union and proposed the following: the union official will guarantee a 
year of “labor peace” if the Ruritanian subsidiary pays the union leader 
$1,000 per month into a designated account in a bank in Miami. Payment 
of this “guarantee” would be worth far more to the company in 
her “willful blindness,” or his or her “conscious disregard,” of the existence of the required 
circumstance or result. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Manrique Aribizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir. 1987), United States v. 
Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 907 (1988), and United States v. 
McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985)). 
 152. Id. 
 153. These evading procedures are precisely what the original FCPA legislators intended to deter. 
See id. 
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maintaining continuity of its operations than the relatively minor cost of 
the payment. The manager consults U.S. counsel and asks for an opinion. 
Because the union official does not meet the definition of a “foreign 
public official” under either the FCPA or the Convention, counsel can feel 
secure to inform his client that the transaction is not illegal. This scenario, 
however, shows a major gap in the current OECD/FCPA anti-foreign 
bribery scheme: bribery which may seriously undermine a significant 
foreign public interest, namely, that of having fairly uncorrupt labor 
unions, may go unpunished.154  
Although U.S. counsel may be aware that Ruritanian law obviously 
proscribes such conduct, she knows that this may not figure as 
prominently among her client’s concerns as a full-blown DOJ or SEC 
investigation. Counsel is nonetheless required to caution her client about 
the possibility of foreign criminal and civil liability, and she is well-
advised to abstain from suggesting to her client that this operation is 
perfectly okay merely because it is beyond the scope of the FCPA and the 
OECD Convention.155 It should be clear to counsel that such a payment, 
though occurring abroad, would be considered squarely corrupt and illegal 
should it occur within the United States.156  
Moreover, this situation would further corruption in Ruritania as well 
as corrupt the business practices of a U.S. company, which is at odds with 
the policy aims of the FCPA.157 This scenario is also at odds with other 
current developments of international law in the areas of corruption and 
bribery. Since 1998, the United Nations has been in the process of drafting 
and promoting ratification of a convention158 that encourages signatories to 
adopt legislation that would deter both public and private acts of 
corruption.159 The United States is a signatory of this convention and, 
 154. As discussed below, the author is aware that article 21 of the new United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, U.N. Doc A/58/422 (adopted Oct. 31, 2003) (“U.N. Convention”), extends bribery 
prohibitions to actions between private individuals.  
 155. As discussed supra, the FCPA and OECD Convention only targets bribery of foreign 
officials, not of private individuals. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a); OECD Convention, supra 
note 9, art. 1, para. 1.  
 156. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) and (b) (Taft-Hartley Act). 
 157. See DOJ Website, supra note 6 (“Congress enacted the FCPA to bring a halt to the bribery of 
foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business system.”). 
 158. The U.N. Convention entered into force on December 14, 2005. Press Release L/T/4389, 
U.N. Department of Public Information, Convention against Corruption ratified by 30th state, Will 
Enter into Force 14 December 2005, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/lt4389.doc.htm. 
 159. The U.N. Convention provides: 
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally in the course of 
economic, financial or commercial activities: 
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presumably, with its ratification would implement laws to prohibit 
transactions such as the one described in this hypothetical, or at least to 
establish its jurisdiction over the acts of a U.S. national committed in 
Ruritania that would be in violation of either U.S. or Ruritanian bribery 
laws. Until that time, U.S. lawyers are placed in the awkward position of 
having to balance ethical and professional dilemmas with their clients’ 
commercial interests.  
Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct suits this situation 
very well: “a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations 
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant 
to the client’s situation.”160 In this situation, counsel is directed by both 
domestic law as it currently stands as well as developments in 
international law that signal that the proposed transaction should be 
discouraged.161  
C. Hypothetical Situation: What if a Charitable Donation Comes Close to 
the Functional Equivalent of a Bribe?  
A U.S.-based telecommunications company, and other U.S. and foreign 
competitors are seeking a concession with a state government in Ruritania, 
a densely populated nation, to lay and operate a multi-billion fiber optic 
data transmission network. Ruritania’s Minister of Telecommunications 
suggests to the U.S. company’s Chief Operations Officer (“COO”) that 
some sort of substantial demonstration of the firm’s “commitment” to its 
Ruritanian expansion would greatly increase the company’s chances of 
(a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any 
person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person 
himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, 
act or refrain from acting; 
(b) The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any person 
who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or 
herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or 
refrain from acting. 
U.N. Convention, supra note 154, art. 21. 
 In addition, the U.N. Convention gives a State Party jurisdiction over an act of correction if the 
offense is committed by a national of that State Party or a stateless person who has his or her habitual 
residence in its territory. Id. art. 42(b).  
 160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002). 
 161. From a strictly a moral standpoint, counsel should consider that advising the client to go 
through with such a transaction would violate various human rights of the workers involved, 
effectively imposing silence against potential labor abuses, and also would impede the workers’ 
realization of their human right to a corruption-free society. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a 
Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption 
to a Crime Under International Law, 34 INT’L LAW. 149 (Spring 2000).  
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winning the concession award. As the COO explains the provisions of the 
FCPA to the Minister, she perceives his distancing and skeptical facial 
expressions with respect to the likelihood of her company’s chances of 
being selected. The COO now is convinced that failure to respond 
positively to the Minister’s opening will result in loss of the contract, but 
she has no intention of exposing either her company or herself to criminal 
liability. She contacts the corporation’s U.S. headquarters and hears from a 
company official that perhaps the Minister is more interested in political 
gain and power than “actual bribery.” Headquarters then suggests that she 
propose that the U.S. company will build and fully furnish a new two 
million dollar public library and museum in the official’s electoral district, 
if awarded the telecom contract. The company official suggests that the 
U.S. company would donate the money to a U.S. foundation that would 
disburse the funds to a local charity, which then would hire local 
contractors selected under a closed-bid scheme, but that at no moment 
would the Minister have access to the funds. The Minister would 
obviously be invited to, and would also appear prominently in, the opening 
festivities. Counsel is requested to provide his own certification that this 
deal complies with the FCPA and the OECD Convention. 
Because the foreign official will have no access to the donated money 
and receive no ascertainable value—only a fairly remote opportunity for 
political gain—this transaction may fall beyond the scope of the FCPA’s 
definition of “corrupt payment.”162 Yet, this situation is beyond the 
innocuous charitable donations that the DOJ has previously determined 
not to investigate under the FCPA.163 The transaction presented here 
involves a narrow political quid pro quo in which the involvement of the 
foreign official is central to the charitable offer. As this situation has the 
 162. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77dd-1(a), dd-2(a), dd-3(a).  
 163. In two separate Opinion Procedure Releases, the DOJ indicates that charitable donations by a 
company either already engaged in the construction of a plant or planning to acquire and operate a 
plant in a foreign country will not be investigated. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, Opinion 
Procedure Release, No. 97-02, Nov. 5, 1997, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 
o9702.htm (donating $100,000 for a proposed school construction project is acceptable because the 
donation was made directly to the government entity responsible for the construction, not to any 
foreign official) (last visited Nov. 9, 2005); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, Opinion Procedure 
Release, No. 95-01, Jan. 11, 1995, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/o9501.htm 
(approving a donation of $10 million in a public ceremony for the construction of a medical facility in 
the region where a U.S. company plans to acquire and operate a plant, where the donation was made 
through a charitable organization incorporated in the United States and through a limited liability 
company in the foreign nation, both of which signed certifications that none of the funds will be 
offered in violation of the FCPA, none of the persons involved were affiliated with the foreign 
government, and the company required audited financial reports detailing the disposition of the 
donated funds) (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).  
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basic characteristics of a bribe (although lacking in tangible value), if it 
were made apparent to the DOJ, the latter would likely initiate an 
investigation. Thus, counsel again is faced with a hard decision: while this 
transaction would appear to be a purely charitable donation, the addition of 
certain internal facts changes its character to one that is suspicious and far 
from innocent.  
Furthermore, it is at least arguable that this transaction would come 
under the purview of the “undue pecuniary or other advantage” language 
of the OECD Convention.164 Opponents of such a broad reading could 
plausibly claim that any further stretching of the definitions of “paying, 
offering or giving something of value,”165 or “intentionally offering, 
promising or giving any undue pecuniary or other advantage”166 to cover 
situations like these would render illegal virtually all contact between 
private interests and government officials, no matter how tenuous the 
connection, merely because such conduct results in political gain for the 
latter. Yet, the laws implementing the Convention in various signatory 
countries certainly leave open the possibility that offering or giving such a 
donation would be an “undue advantage” or “bribe.”167 This leaves 
 164. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1.  
 165. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77dd-1(a), -2(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 166. See OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 1, para. 1 (emphasis added).  
 167. OECD country reports on the signatory states’ implementation of the Convention reveal that 
some states envision a very broad interpretation of bribe or undue advantage. See OECD, Country 
Reports on the Implementation of the Convention, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/24/ 
0,2340,en_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). For example, the 
Luxembourg Criminal Code includes in its definition of a bribe “any advantages whatsoever,” 
reflecting their desire to cover “any other advantage whatsoever, whether material, intellectual or 
social, for the offender or for any other person . . . [and] approaches of all kinds, recommendations, 
favorable interventions, votes, sexual relations, etc.” OECD, Luxembourg: Review of Implementation 
of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 5, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/ 
40/2019732.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). The Slovak Criminal Code and Slovak Authorities define 
bribery as an undue advantage in the form of a pecuniary or natural performance, or any other 
advantage (e.g., mutual service or assistance) and that it comprises anything that can be defined as a 
benefit, including “dealing with a case in a shorter time as usual, the offering of a better carrier 
perspective or promotion, or the granting of additional holidays.” OECD, Slovak Republic Review of 
Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 4, available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/16/15/2389408.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). Usually, a bribe is any advantage, with only 
small exceptions for gifts or advantages of minor value or that are “socially acceptable,” or in some 
cases if it is permitted by law or case law. See id. See also OECD, France: Review of Implementation 
of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 6, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
24/50/2076560.pdf (“corruption involves the act of proposing ‘without right’ . . . . [T]he term without 
right means that the advantage is neither permitted by law nor required by any statute or case law 
currently in force.”) (last visited Nov. 9, 2005); OECD, Korea: Review of Implementation of the 
Convention and 1997 Recommendation, at 2, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/6/ 
2388296.pdf (“case law confirms that the advantage, which is the substance of the bribe, includes 
money, goods and other pecuniary advantages, as well as intangible benefits (such as the opportunity 
of having a sexual relationship) that satisfy the demand or desire of a person.”) (last visited Nov. 9, 
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counsel in a particularly perplexing position, as it is far from clear whether 
this transaction would be prohibited, given that it would depend on how 
Ruritania adopted the Convention and interpreted its meaning.  
In addition, even if one assumed that this transaction does not implicate 
either the FCPA or the OECD Convention, this does not mean that this 
transaction is fair. Indeed, to focus only on a given client’s civil or 
criminal liability deflects attention from the inherently unfair nature of 
such transaction, for one of its direct consequences is that both U.S. and 
non-U.S. competitors of the successful corporation here might never get a 
fair chance. This scenario then shows another major gap in the current 
anti-foreign bribery scheme: charitable contributions that come fairly close 
to the functional equivalent of a bribe will continue to undermine the 
inherent fairness of foreign transactions if they are not required to be 
disclosed fully well in advance of a final foreign contract award.  
One may posit, however, that requiring full disclosure of donations 
linked to international business transactions would not ultimately improve 
fairness in international business transactions because competitors might 
then try to hide such contributions, or merely engage in outright corruption 
efforts. But this “race to the bottom” argument will not carry the day so 
long as the current anti-bribery regime is kept in place. Moreover, 
requiring more disclosure while keeping or increasing the current level of 
enforcement may have quite a different result: it may provide strong 
incentives for a “race to the top” in terms of foreign competition. We need 
not look much farther than at the present example. If disclosure is 
required, the U.S. telecom might be forced to “up the ante” after one of its 
competitors makes a higher “charitable donation.” Whoever makes a more 
significant “bid” will win the contract.  
CONCLUSION 
As required by the FCPA and other federal statutes, companies 
engaged in international business transactions must exercise great care in 
ensuring their compliance with the rules governing such transactions. 
While the OECD Convention closely resembles the FCPA, it is clear that 
2005).  
 Moreover, one can argue that the U.N. Convention may also require states to bar this type of 
transaction regardless whether it involves a public or private figure. The U.N. Convention prohibits, 
with respect to both public and private figures, making a promise, gift, offer, solicitation, or 
acceptance of an “undue advantage.” U.N. Convention, supra note 154, arts. 16, 21. Again, this 
depends upon a broad reading of the term “bribe” or “undue advantage,” which as discussed above, 
many countries have already adopted in their implementing statutes.  
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it effectuated a tremendous change. Due to the OECD Convention’s 
adoption by more than thirty-five nations, the United States is no longer 
the sole country with clear policies and laws geared towards fighting 
corruption in foreign transactions.168 Furthermore, the Convention’s 
importance lies in the fact that it provides for essential mutual legal 
assistance among signatory countries.169 This development has led a 
commentator to indicate that the Convention “will enable U.S. authorities 
to acquire evidence that typically was not obtainable in the past.”170  
The net result of these developments is that international legal 
practitioners not only are going to be at the forefront of the developing 
anti-bribery mechanisms, but will also be more often challenged by them. 
So long as clients tread the fine line that separates legality from bribery, 
lawyers will have to rely on the ethical principles contained in the 
professional rules of conduct. Neither the FCPA nor the OECD 
Convention are equipped to deter all forms of foreign corruption that may 
occur. In the end, as is the case in other legal areas, there is no substitute 
for professional and ethical judgment. 
 168. See Steps Taken and Planned Future Actions by Participating Countries to Ratify and 
Implement the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Information as of 17 December 2003, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/33/1827022.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2005).  
 169. OECD Convention, supra note 9, art. 9.  
 170. Deming, supra note 12, at 515. 
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